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ATA TIME whenmarket interest rates have soared
to levels never before reached in this country, rates
on deposits at banks and other financial institutions
have been held much lower, The rate commercial
banks charge on prime business loans has been 8½
per cent since early last June. Mortgage and many
other market interest rates are currently about as high.
On the other hand, payment of interest is pro-
hibited on demand deposits, and the maximum rates
permitted on time and savings deposits vary between
4.50 and 7.50 per cent.1 The highest rate applies only
to deposits in denominations of $100,000 or more
maturing in a year or longer. Smaller time and sav-
ings deposits are permitted to yield 4.50 to 5.75 per
cent (see table below).
YIELD DIFFERENTIALS
(Per Cent Per Annum)
Spread between
Government Security
Reguletion 0 Yield and Comparable
Type of Deposit Ceding Rate Cel ng Rate
Savings deposits 450 (30 days) 2 64
Other time deposits
Multiple maturity
30 89 days 4.50 (3 - ma.) 3 57
90 days or more £00 (6 mc) 3.11
Single maturity
Less than $100,000
30daystol year 5.00 (6 ma) 3.11
1 year £50 (12 mc.) 253
2year $75 (Zyrs) 240
$100,000 or mare
30 59 days 6.25 (3 - ma.) 1 82
60 89 days &50 (3-mo) 1.57
9Ol79days 6.75 (6-ma) 136
180 days tot year 7.00 (12 ma) 1.03
1 year or mare 750 (12 ma) 053
°On January 21 1870. vs ids (bondyzeld equ’ alents, foot-
no 6) re 7.14 Pc cent on T amury bit m tur,n in 30
days 8.0 p r cent on th ce-month bill , 811 per cent on 5 -
month bill 8.0 pe nt on twelv month bill . and & , per cent
on notes snaturin is as,proxn,at I t o yea {Febru ry 1872).
° The author acknowledges the work of Elaine Cohdstein,
who initiated this study of the history of Regulation Q.
1Time deposits are defined in Regulation Q of the Federal
Reserve to include “time certificates of deposit” and “time
deposits, open account,” both of which have maturities not
less than 30 days or require 30 days written notice prior to
withdrawal. Savings deposits are not subject to any maturity
or withdrawal notice by the deposit contract, but the bank
may at any time require 30 days notice prior to withdrawal.
In this article, “time deposits” will be used to refer to de-
posits other than demand and savings; “time and savings
deposits” will refer to the broad class of bank deposits which
is distinct from demand deposits.
These ceilings were adopted January 21, 1970. Dur-
ing 1969 the ceilings were lower, \vith yields on small
time deposits limited to 5 per cent or less, a rate which
didnot compensate savers for the 6 per cent decline in
the purchasing po\ver of their funds.
Interest rate ceilings on deposits at banks which
are members of the Federal Reserve System are es-
tablished under Federal Reserve Regulation Q. Ceil-
ings at insured nonmember banks, which have been
the same as for mernher banks, are set by a regula-
tion of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.2
These Regulations stem from Banking Acts of 1933
and 1935, respectively.3 Some states have at times im-
posed ceilings for state-chartered banks which are
lower than those established by the Federal agencies.
There were no explicit nationwide regulations on
interest and dividend rates at mutual savings banks
and savings and loan associations until 1966. Legisla-
tion in September of that year brought rates paid by
Federally insured mutual savings banks under the
control of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and rates paid at savings and loan associations which
are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
under its control. That legislation also required the
three regulatory agencies to consult with each other
when considering changes in the ceiling rates.
This article examines changes in the maximum
rates payable on commercial bank time and savings
deposits. The maximum rate permitted on demand
deposits has been zero since 1933.~Ceiling rates on
time and savings deposits have been changed from
time to time during the past 35 years, particularly
during the 1960’s. Two factors largely responsible for
changes during the Sixties were the rising level of
2Changes in maximum rates permitted at nonmember banks
are given in the Annual Reports of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. See for example, in The Annual Re-
port of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1968, pp.
14.5-147.
3
Historieal background on interest rate restrictions, including
developments prior to 1933, are summarized in “Interest
Rate Controls — Perspective, Purpose and Problems” by
Clifton B. Luttrell in the September 1968 issue of this
Review, also available as Reprint No. 32. See also Albert H.
Cox, Jr., Regulation of interest Rates on Bank Deposits,
Michigan Business Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan, 1966), pp. 1-30. 4The implications of this interest rate ceiling for bank be-
havior have been analyzed by Donald R. Hodgman in
Commercial Bank Loan and investment Policy (Champaign:
University of Illinois, 1963).
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market interest rates and the growing importance of
large certificates of deposit as a money market instru-
ment. Use of negotiable certificates of deposit as a
means of attracting large accumulations of money
market funds began in February 1961, when the First
National City Bank of New York announced it would
offer large denomination negotiable CD’s, and the
Discount Corporation, a Government securities dOaler,
announced it would make a market for them.~The
transferability of these CD’s enhanced their desira-
bility as a financial asset.
Changes in ceiling rates have usually been consid-
ered and made when ceilings were out of line with
market interest rates. However, Chart I, showing
market yields on a bond-yield equivalent basis and
Regulation Q ceilings on two types of deposits, sug-
gests that ceiling rates have sometimes remained
out of touch with market conditions.°Changes in the
structure of ceilings or in the relationship between
market rates and the ceilings have, at times, been
permitted in order to direct the flow of funds among
°Heien B. O’Bannon, “Certificates of Deposit,” in Money and
Finance: Readings in Theory, Policy, and Institutions, ed. by
Deane Carson (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1966),
pp. 118-124. 6
1n this article interest rates on Treasury bills and commercial
paper are quoted on a bond-yield equivalent (rather than
discount) basis to make them comparable to rates on time
and savings deposits.
(1) to chronicle changes in ceiling rates;
(2) to indicate reasons expressed by policymakers
for making or dissenting from the changes; and
(3) to evaluate the feasibility of achieving intended
goals through deposit rate regulations.
The exhibit on pages 32 and 33 summarizes changes
in the ceiling rates and the reasons behind them,
Emphasis on Prevention of
Destructive Competition
November 1933 — As the Federal Reserve Board
implemented its authority by adopting Regulation Q
on November 1, 1933, the main theme was the pre-
vention of destructive interest rate competition, which
members of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, commercial bankers, and others believed
to have been one cause of bank failures in earlier
years. Possible destructive rate competition was often
cited in later years as a reason for objecting to higher
ceilings or as a justification for a particular structure
of ceiling rates,
The Federal Reserve Board set a 3 per cent maxi-
mum rate on all time and savings deposits, effective
financial institutions, geographical areas, or sectors of
the economy, or to accomplish stabilization objectives.
This article has three purposes:
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November 1, 1933. On average for the year, the
ceiling was above some short-term market rates, but
below the rates apparently being paid on deposits at
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and
mutual savings banks. Comparing total time and sav-
ings deposits at all commercial banks with interest
expense of banks suggests that they were paying an
“effective” average rate of 3.4 per cent in 1933. Similar
measures for savings and loan associations and mutual
savings banks indicate the same rate.7 Market interest
rates on high-grade short-term securities were far
below 3 per cent. The three-month Treasury bill rate
averaged 33 per cent in 1933, while rates on prime
four- to six-month commercial paper averaged L77
per cent. The average rate banks charged on com-
mercial loans in New York City fell from a peak of
4.79 per cent in March 1933 to 2M1 per cent in
December.
February 1935 — In early 1935 the Board lowered
the ceiling rate to 2½ per cent, accepting a recom-
mendation of the Federal Advisory Council (com-
posed of commercial bankers):
in view of the wide divergence in rates of
interest now being paid on thrift and other time
deposits in different sections of the country, and
in view of the increasing difficulty of obtaining
from suitable investments a yield sufficient to
warrant payment of the maximum rate now
fixed under provision of Regulation Q of the
Federal Reserve Board, it is recommended that
the Board give consideration to the advisability
of lowering the present maximum rate.
In the opinion of the Council the present rate
might well be lowered one-half of one per
cent.5
January 1936 — The Federal Reserve set different
rates for time deposits with various maturities as of
January 1, 1936, lowering the ceilings on short-term
deposits. The maximum rate payable was changed to
1 per cent on time deposits maturing in less than 90
days, and to 2 per cent on those maturing in from 3
to 6 months. The Board stated “. ..that banks were
not justified in paying as high rates of interest for time
deposits having shorter maturities in view of their
greater availability for withdrawals and therefore that
TThis “effective” rate is calculated by dividing interest ex-
pense of all commercial banks by average balance of time
and savings deposits for the year, and is a crude, but about
the only, measure of rates banks were paying. The deficien-
cies of this measure are brought out by Albert I-I. Cox Jr.,
op. cit. p. 37. For one thing, it ignores maturity. For a listin
of annual effectiveyields from 1930 through 1968, see Unite
States Savings and Loan League, Savings and Loan Fact
Book, 1969, p. 17.
8Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1934, p. 203.
the rates fixed by the Board should be graduated ac-
cording to maturities.”9Discussions associated with the
change pointed to the general downward trend of
interest rates and the fact that many banks were find-
ing it necessary to make further reductions in rates
paid depositors because of decreased earnings. This
comment suggests that banks were responding ration-
ally to market forces and that any ceiling rate may
have been superfluous. The lower ceilings, neverthe-
less, vindicated bank actions to their depositors.
Those favoring ceilings in order to limit “destruc-
tive competition”felt that freecompetition for deposits
would force some banks to offer rates on short-
term funds which were out of line with returns ob-
tainable on assets “suitable” for banks to hold. In order
to earn a return higher than it was paying on deposits,
a bank might accept higher-risk and longer-term as-
sets, thus impairing the liquidity and solvency of that
bank and the banking system.
If the aggregate relation between interest expense
and deposits adequately measures the rates banks
pay, this argument seems to provide some justification
for ceiling rates. In 1933 this measure shows banks
paying rates higher than the rates on high-grade
short-term securities. Banks were paying an average
effective rate of 3.4 per cent, about twice the rate on
prime four- to six-month commercial paper. The rates
banks were paying do not appear significantly dif-
ferent from rates they were charging on short-term
business loans. It could be argued that banks were
offering strongly competitive rates to improve li-
quidity, which had fallen because of strong demands
for currency and liquidity in the rest of the economy.
This might be considered corrective behavior, while
restraint on competition imposed by ceiling rates
simply treated symptoms rather than the cause of the
financial crisis.
Regulation Q ceilings do not appear to have en-
couraged or safeguarded bank liquidity. On the con-
trary, liquidity, in terms of the ratio of loans to de-
posits, has often dropped (the ratio rising) during
periods when Regulation Q constrained competition
for funds. For example, the ratio of loans to total
deposits increased from 61.1 per cent in December
1968 to 67.8 per cent in December 1969, a period
in which Regulation Q was the primary cause
of a $10.7 billion decline in time and savings deposits.
Chart II, a comparison of the spread between the
market yield on prime four- to six-month commercial
°FederalReserve Board, Annual Report, 1935, p. 211.
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REGULATION Q CEILING RATES
CeU~ngRotn* Reasons for C&Umgs
Nov. 1, 1933 All time and savings deposits 3.00% To prevent interest rate competition which might lead to
bank failures.
Feb. 1, 1935 All time and savings deposits 2.50% Market rates had been declining.
No investments suitable for banks offered ceiling rate.
The increasing spread in rates being paid in different
areas of the country was considered undesirable.
Jan. 1 • 1936 Savings deposits 2.50% Market interest rates had been declining; rates offered by
Other time deposits banks had been reduced.
Less than 90 days 1.00 Time deposits with shorter maturities should earn a lower
90 days . 6 months 2,00 rate of return.
6 months or longer 2.50
Jan. 1, 1957 Savings deposits 3.00% Market interest rates had risen above ceilings. Robertson: Raising ceilings would impair bank liquidity
Other time deposits Banks should have greater flexibility in competing for and solvency as they sought higher yielding assets in
Less than 90 days 1.00 funds, order to pay higher rates.
90 days - 6 months 2.50
6 months or longer 3.00
Jan. I, 1962 Savings deposits
Less than 12 months 3.50%
To enable banks to attract longer-term savings and
permit investment in longer-term assets needed for eco-
King: Rate competition would hove adverse effects on
many commercial banks without making a significant
12 months or more 4.00 nomic expansion, contribution to solution of the U.S. Balance of Payments
Other time deposits To enhance freedom of competition and efficiency of deficit, and present savings were adequate for eco-
Less than 90 days 1.00 allocation. nomic expansion.
90 days - 6 months 2.50 To enable banks to compete for foreign deposits.
6 months - 12 months 3.50
12 months or more 4.00
July 17, 1963 Savings deposits To ovoid outflows of funds to foreign competition.
Less than 12 months 3.50% To prevent a run-off of bank time deposits, which might
12 months or more 4.00 unduly tighten bank credit, given the discount rate
Other time deposits increase.
Less than 90 days 1.00 To eliminate bookkeeping in efficiency cause by splintered .
90 days or more 4.00 ceiling rates.
Nov. 24, 1964 Savings deposits 4.00% To insure a sufficient flow of funds through banks to Robertson — To lhe 4 percent ceiling on other time
Other time deposits finance domestic investment, deposits: This increase would aggravate volatility of
Less than 90 days 4.00 To avoid outflows of funds to foreign competition, deposits.
90 days or more 4.50 Savings deposits rate was not raised higher because it
might then disturb the relationship with rates of other
thrift institutions and complicate Treasury financing,
A higher rate on short time deposits might compel unwise
competition.
Shepardson and Robertson — To a4percent ceiling
on savings deposits: It was discriminatory to small
savers in view of the 4.5 percent rate permitted on
some other time deposits.
Date
Rftectiye DissentsDec. 6, 1965 Savings deposits 4.00% To enable banks to attract and retain time deposits and Robertson: It would conflict with credit restraint hoped
Other time deposits 5.50 therefore make more effective use of funds already in the from the discount rate increase.
economy to finance loan expansion. Larger banks would be able to attract funds from
Market interest rates had risen since November 1964 smaller banks which rely on demand and time deposits.
under demand pressure, It would force smaller banks into higher risk positions.
July 20, 1966 Savings deposits 4.00% To help forestall excessive interest rate competition among
Other time deposits financial institutions at a time when monetary policy was
Multiple maturity aimed at curbing the rate of expansion of bank credit.
30 - 89 days 4.00
90 days Or more 5.00
Single maturity 5.50
Sept. 26, 1966 Savings deposits 4.00% To limit further escalation of interest rates paid in com-
Other time deposits petition for consumer savings.
Multiple maturity To keep growth of commercial bank credit to a moderate
30 - 89 days 4.00 pace.
90 days or more 5.00
Single maturity
Less than $100,000 5.00
$100,000 Or more 5.50
Apr, 19, 1968 Savings deposits 4.00% To supplement policy measures of monetary restraint.
Other time deposits To give banks some leeway to compete for interest sensi-
Multiple maturity tive funds.
30 - 89 days 4.00 To resist reduction in CD’s while not promoting expansion
90 days Or more 5.00 of bank credit.
Single maturity
Less than $100,000 5.00
$100,000 or more
30 - 59 days 5.50
60 - 89 days 5.75
90 days - 6 months 6.00
More than 6 months 6,25
Jan. 21, 1970 Savings deposits 4.50% To bring ceilings more in line with market rates,
Other time deposits Ta raise rate on small savings.
Multiple maturity To encourage longer-term savings in reinforcement of
30 - 89 days 4.50 anti-inflationary measures.
90 days or more 5.00 Ta increase the pool of savings for investment in
Single maturity mortgages.
Less than $100,000




30 - 59 days 6.25
60 - 89 days 6.50
90 - 179 days 6.75
I80 days to 1 year 7.00
1 year or more 7.50
Cyho ceiling sates which were changed are shown in boldface type,
Pt
5)






paper and the highest Regulation Q ceilmg with hank During the late Fifties and early Sixties, market
liquidity ratios, suggests that ceilings, when effective, yields rose and interest rate ceilings were raised in
have had an adverse effect on bank liquidity by actions reflecting the view that ceilings should be
forcing a run-off of deposits at the very time when generally in line with market rates. In deliberations
credit demands at banks have been strongest. on the changes, prevention of undue restriction on
competition was emphasized more than was preven-
tion of destructive competition. Ceiling Rates Raised to Permit
Freedom of Competition
The ceiling rates remained unchanged for twenty-
one years from 1936 to 1957, Market rates, too, were
relatively stable until the late Forties. Beginning
then, market rates increased somewhat but, in general,
remained below the ceilings. Therefore, during this
twenty-one year period, Regulation Q ceilings were
virtually forgotten by both bankers and public
policymakers.
January 1957 — In the mid-1950’s short-term mar-
ket interest rates rose above Regulation Q ceilings.
The average rate on prime four- to six-month commer-
cial paper was 3.41 per cent in 1956; three-month
Treasury bills were trading at an average rate of 2.67
per cent; and savings and loan associations were pay-
ing, on average, an “effective” rate of 3 per cent. In
contrast, commercial banks were paying an “effective”
rate of 1.6 per cent on time and savings deposits,
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while ceiling rates remained at the 1 to 2.5 per cent
levels established in 1936.
Because banks were not offering competitive yields,
time and savings deposits suffered a relative decline.
From 1955 to 1956 time and savings deposits increased
only 3.3 per cent, compared with a 7.2 per cent aver-
age annual rate in the previous four years. Deposits
at savings and loan associations and at mutual savings
banks rose 15.6 per cent and 6.4 per cent, respectively,
during 1956, compared with rates slightly faster in
the previous four years.
In view of this situation the rate ceilings on bank
time and savings deposits were raised effective
January 1, 1957, in order to give banks greater flexi-
bility in competing for funds. The maximum rate
payable on time deposits of less than 90 days remained
1 per cent, while rates permitted on other time and
savings deposits were raised one-half of one percent-
age point. The specific reasoning behind the decision
was that:
- there was insufficient reason to prevent
banks, in the exercise of management discre-
tion, from competing actively for time and sav-
ings balances by offering rates more nearly in
line with other market rates. By increasing the
rate limitations only on savings deposits and
on time deposits with maturities longer than
90 days, the Board continued to recognize the spe-
cialthrift characterof savings accounts andtopre-
serve a differential between longer-term time
deposits and short-term time deposits represent-
ing essentially liquid balances.1°
Governor Robertson voted against the change, go-
ing back to arguments presented at the hearings on
the Banking Act of 1933. He held that it would in-
crease bank operating costs, making it more difficult
for banks to raise additional capital, that it would
make banks seek higher yielding assets and impair
the liquidity and solvency of the banking system, and
that short-term funds “should he invested in open
market paper, so that holders would have to bear the
burden and risks of fluctuating rates and not shift
that risk to the banking system.”11
January 1962 — In general the Governors took a
more favorable attitude toward rate competition, and
the ceilings were raised again on January 1, 1962. The
change resulted in some further splintering in the
classification of time and savings deposits, as the
‘°Federal Reserve Board Annual Report, 1956, pp. 52-53.
‘-‘Ibid, pp. 54-55 contain a full statement by Governor
Robertson, giving considerable detail on why there should
be ceiling rates and why they should not be raised at
certain times.
Board distinguished maturities longer than one year
from shorter maturities. Ceilings on savings deposits
and on time deposits with maturities of six to twelve
months were raised from 3 per cent to 3.5 per cent,
and banks were permitted to offer a rate of 4 per cent
on time and savings deposits held for twelve months
or longer.
The Board of Governors felt that the resulting flexi-
bility and freedom of competition would be useful
for three reasons: (1) it would enhance economic
grosvth; (2) it would contribute to improving the
United States balance-of-payments position; and (3) it
would have a healthy effect on the management of in-
dividual banks. The impacton growth was expected to
come through encouraging the flow of bank funds to
longer-term assets. “By permitting higher rates to be
paid on deposits held for longer periods, the new
limits would make it possible for banks to attract
long-term savings, in contrast to volatile liquid funds,
and thereby give banks greater assurance that they
could invest a larger portion of their time deposits in
longer-term assets,”12 This possible effect on the se-
lection of bank assets was one reason Governor King
dissented and Governor Mills questioned the action.
Another reason for raising the ceilings in 1962 was
that it would permit competition for foreign deposits
“that might otherwise move abroad in search of
higher returns, thereby intensifying an outflow of
capital or gold to other countries.”3 Balance-of-pay-
ments considerations also played a part in subsequent
changes of the ceilings. In October 1962, legislation
was passed which exempted deposits of foreign
governments, and certain international institutions in
which the United States was a participant, from the
deposit rate ceilings for three years. Exempting legis-
lation and exemption under Regulation Q were
renewed in 1965 and 1968.
In discussing competition, most Governors empha-
sized the desirable rather than the possibly destruc-
tive effects. They felt that the higher ceilings would
“enable each member bank to determine the rates of
interest it would pay in light of the conditions pre-
vailing in its area, the type of competition it must
meet and its ability to pay.”4 Governor Robertson
specifically expressed this thought — urging ceiling
rates even higher than many banks might pay, in
order to place responsibility for determining rates
upon the individual bank. He noted that Regulation
‘
2
Federal Reserve Board Annual Report, 1961, p. 103.
~~Ibid,p. 102.
‘~Ibid,p. 102.
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Q might impart the unintended and unwanted idea
that ceilings indicated what the Federal Reserve
thinks banks ought to be paying.’5 This view of coin-
petition seems to suggest that the ceilings were not
essential in preventing undue concentration of funds





impact of Higher Ceiling
Other Savings Institutions
Housing
One reservation about freer competition for com-
mercial banks was its possible impact on other savings
institutions. Governor Mills voted for the increase in
ceilings in 1962, but questioned going above a3½ per
cent maximum, which would retain the usual spread
between rates on commercial bank deposits and rates
on deposits at other savings institutions.”~The aggre-
gate “effective” rates paid by both banks and savings
and loan associations had continued to rise in the late
Fifties and early Sixties. In 1961 savings and loans
were paying an average “effective” rate of 3.92 per
cent, compared with 2.71 per cent for commercial
banks. In 1962, after the ceilings were raised, the rate
at banks jumped nearly 50 basis points, compared
with a 15 basis point increase at savings and loan
associations.
Concern over nonbank thrift institutions has been
behind resistance to raising Regulation Q ceilings
~~Ibid, p. 104.
lGIbid, p. 103.
at least since 1962, It has been argued by many, in-
eluding those associated with savings and loan asso-
ciations and mutual savings banks, that, because these
institutions enhance the availability of credit for
housing, they should be givenan advantage in the com-
petition for consumer-type savings.
While it is important that there be an optimal flow
of funds into the construction of housing, it should
he considered whether regulation of hank interest
rates accomplishes this goal, and whether this method
involves costs which could be avoided.
The examples of 1966 and 1969, when interest rate
ceilings effectively prevented both banks and other
thrift institutions from competing for funds, seem to
suggest that the ceilings alone cannot accomplish an
optimal flow of funds into housing. From May to
November 1966, growth of deposits at savings and
loan associations was only a 23 per cent annual rate
compared with an 11 per cent rate in the previous
4½years. In the last half of 1969 the increase was
at a L6 per cent rate, compared with 5.4 per cent in
the previous year.
It has sometimes been argued that because savings
and loan associations invest in longer-term assets than
banks, they cannot adjust so easily as banks to changes
in interest rates. Therefore, without differential ceil-
ing rates, held stable even when market rates vary,
savings and loan associations could not operate prof-
itably. However, longer-term assets only imply that
a savings and loan association requires a relatively
large amount of reserves in order to pay a higher rate
on deposits than the average rate earned on assets
during a period of transition. As savings and loan
associations adjust the rates charged on loans, they
should be able to restore a workable relation between
interest expense andinterest earnings?7
Inability to attract and retain deposited funds is
potentially as dangerous to savings and loan associa-
tions as is paying higher rates in the short-run than
they are able to earn. During 1969, Government
agencies tried to supplement savings and loan sources
of funds by selling securities in the capital market at
competitive rates and lending the proceeds to savings
and loan associations. As a result savings and loan
associations pay the higher competitive yield only on
marginal funds, with fewer funds directed away from




See Nonnan N. Bowsher and Lionell Kalish, “Does Slower
Monetary Expansion Discriminate Against Housing? in
the June 1968 issue of this Review, also available as
Reprint No. 29.
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It appears that the interest rate ceilings have not
accomplished the goal of encouraging housing. In
fact, they probably have made credit for housing
more difficult to obtain. On the other hand, they have
encouraged the Government to protect a specific set
of institutions and to provide services which regula-
tions hinder private markets from providing.
Changes in Ceiling Rates to Influence
Growth of Bank Credit
Beginning with the change of ceilings in 1963, the
influence of Regulation Q on the gro~vthof bank
credit has gradually become the focus in discussions
of changing ceilings. The flow of deposits into banks
is one factor influencing the ability of banks to expand
loans and investments. The relation of interest rate
ceilings to market rates is, in turn, an important factor
influencing the amount of time and savings deposits
which banks are able to attract. Therefore, through
its influence on bank credit, Regulation Q has come
to be considered a major tool of monetary stabiiza-
lion policy.
July 1963 — The change which took place in July
1963 raised the ceiling rates on all time deposits held
longer than 90 days to 4 per cent, eliminating some
of the previous splintering in the rates. While the
balance-of-payments was cited as the primary reason
for the change, Governor Robertson, who dissented
from the concurrent discount rate increase from 3 to
3½ per cent, added that the increase in ceilings was
necessary to offset any restrictive impact of the dis-
count rate increase on bank credit.’8
November 1964 — In November 1964 ceiling rates
were raised again, after some further increases in
market interest rates and in conjunction with a dis-
count rate increase to 4 per cent, The action adjusted
the maximum rate on time deposits held less than 90
days from 1 per cent to 4 per cent, while raising that
on longer maturities to 4.5 per cent. The differential
ceiling rates on savings deposits were also eliminated
by permitting a rate of 4 per cent on any savings
deposit held longer than 30 days.
The principal reasons for raising the ceilings were
to insure a sufficient flow of funds through banks to
finance domestic investment and to avoid an outflow
of funds which might worsen the balance-of-pay-
ments deficit. Again, Governor Robertson thought that
‘
8
Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1963, pp. 39-40.
some change in the maximum interest rates permitted
under Regulation 9 was xvarranted by the need topre-
vent a run-off of time deposits. He dissented from
raising the ceiling to 4 per cent on time deposits \vith
maturities less than 90 days, however, because he ex-
pected it to “encourage the replacement of maturing
certificates of deposit with new certificates of shorter
original maturities, thus aggravating hank depositvola-
tility and pressures upon bank liquidity positions.”~°
Both Governor Robertson and Governor Shepard-
son thought that a 4.5 per cent maximum on savings
deposits would be appropriate in that it would treat
small savers more equitably. The majority of the
Board of Governors, however, felt a4per cent rate
would preserve the prevailing relationship between
rates paid on savings deposits by commercial banks
and those paid by savings institutions such as mutual
savings banks and savings and loan associations,
\vhereas a higher ceiling might encourage unwise
competition and possibly complicate Treasury financ-
ing prohlenis.20
December .1965 — In December 1965 an increase in
ceiling rates was intended to pennit some continued
orderly expansion in bank credit while other policy
instruments exercised restraint. The maximum rate
payable on time deposits, regardless of maturity,
was raised to 5.5 per cent, while the ceiling on sav-
ings deposits remained 4 per cent. The discount rate
~vas again raised — this time to 4,5 per cent. Most of
the discussion reported concerned the discount rate
action and the majority view that monetary policy
should move promptly against inflationary credit
expansion, at a time when market rates had been
rising under demand pressures, resource-use had been
intensifying, and the pace of Government expendi-
tures was accelerating.
The increase in Regulation 9 ceiling rates was in-
tended to help stabilize the growth of bank time
deposits and thereby permit banks to make more ef-
fective use of funds than when they are uncertain
about retaining deposits. The general idea that regu-
lated rates should be in line with market rates is
reflected in the statement: “In addition, a pattern of
interest rates that was accepted by borrowers and
lenders as fully reflecting market forces should, it was
thought, add assurance of a smooth flow of funds to
all sectors of the economy.”2’




Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1965, pp. 64-65.
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Governor Robertson, however, dissented on the
grounds that the increase in ceilings would conffict
with the credit restraint hoped for from the discount
rate increase. The alternative action he suggested
was to dampen bank issuance of promissory notes by
defining them as deposits, while maintaining the
current discount rate and interest rate ceilings on
deposits. He also felt that higher ceilings would shift
deposits from smaller to larger banks or force smaller
banks into higher-risk assets.2’
July 1966 — The ceiling rate structure of 4 per cent
on savings deposits and 5.5 per cent on time deposits
lasted little more than six months. In July 1966 the
Board of Governors took two actions influencing ceil-
ing rates. For one thing they lowered the ceiling rate
on multiple maturity deposits. A multiple maturity
deposit was distinguished from single maturity as
one: (1) payable at the depositor’s option on more
than one date; or (2) payable after written notice;
or (3) subject to automatic renewal at maturity.
Maximum rates on multiple maturity deposits were
lowered to 5 per cent if held more than 90 days and
to 4 per cent if held only 30-89 days. This lowering
of rates was intended to inhibit competition between
banks and thrift institutions “at a time when mone-
tary policy was aimed at curbing the expansion of
bank credit.”
The other action was to recommend legislation to
facilitate distinction between consumer-type deposits
and money market GD’s. The Board considered
the previous action of defining multiple maturity
deposits only a partial attempt at this. They recom-
mended that Congress broaden the authority of the
Federal Reserve by allowing them to distinguish de-
posits by amount in regulating rates, and that it ex-
tend similar authority to the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to detennine maximum rates at savings
and loan associations.
September 1966 — Public Law 89-597, passed Sep-
tember 1966, permitted time deposits under $100,000
to be treated differently from larger ones in regulating
maximum rates and authorized national regulation
of maximum rates paid by savings and loan associa-
tions and mutual savings banks. On the same day the
law was signed, the maximum rate on any time
deposit less than $100,000 (excluding passbook sav-
ings deposits) was set at 5 per cent. Like the previous
reduction, this one was intended to limit rate in-
creases caused by competition for household savings,
~~ffijd, p. 70.
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Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1966, pp. 104-106.
and to keep the growth of hank credit at a moderate
pace.’4
During 1966 market interest rates continued their
upward trend, culminating in the so-called “credit
crunch.” Yields on prime four- to six-month commer-
cial paper reached 6.11 per cent and yields on three-
month Treasury hills reached 5.08 per cent in August
1966. Rates paid at banks and savings and loan as-
sociations were not competitive with these other mar-
ket instruments. As a result, the growth of lime and
savings deposits sloxved substantially. In early 1967
market interest rates subsided somewhat, financial in-
stitutions could again attract funds, and growth of
deposits quickly moved to the previous rapid trends.
April 1968 — In the spring of 1968, market interest
rates climbed into the range at which ceihngs pre-
vented banks from competing for funds as effectively
as before. In April the ceiling rates on large denomi-
nation GD’s were raised “in order to give banks some
leeway to conipete for interest-sensitive funds.” Rates
on single maturity CD’s in denominations larger than
$100,000 were raised to 5.75 per cent if held 60 to
89 days, to 6 per cent if held 90 days to 6 months,
and to 6.25 per cent if held longer than 6 months.
Ceiling rates on other time deposits were not raised;
the resulting structure was considered sufficient to re-
sist the run-off of CD’s, while not promoting expan-
sion of bank credit.”
1969 — While the relationship between ceiling rates
and market interest rates changed significantly in
1969, no change was made in ceiling rates. For
example, the spread between yields on four- to six-
month commercial paper and the ceiling rate on
three- to six-month GD’s was over 3 percentage
points at the end of 1969. Prior to the last time ceiling
rates were raised, in 1968, the spread was about one-
half of one percentage point. As a result of the change
in relative yields, by December 1969 banks had lost
over half of the $24 billion in GD’s held in December
1968. Other time and savings deposits, savings and
loan capital, and mutual savings bank deposits also
stopped increasing or increased at substantially slower
rates than in 1968.
Bank credit increased only 2.5 per cent in 1969,
after rising 11 per cent in 1968. This slowing was due
partly to slo\ver growth of the monetary base and
partly due to the impact of Regulation 9.
January 1970 — The disintermediation in 1969 led
to an upward revision in the ceiling rates effective
January 21. The maximum rate on bank savings de-
“Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report, 1968, pp. 69-70.
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posits became 4.5 per cent. Small certificates (less
than $100,000) are now permitted to yield 5.nO per
cent if they mature in one year, and 5.75 per cent if
they mature in two years. The ceiling on each matur-
ity classification of large GD’s was raised ¾ of a per-
centage point, and a new classification, large GD’s
maturing in a year or more, is permitted to yield
7.50 per cent.
The changes \vere made to bring the structure of
ceiling rates “.,.somewhat more in line with going
yields on market securities,” to permit a more equi-
table rate on small savings, and “. .-to encourage
longer-term savings in reinforcement of anti-infla-
tionary measures.” Along with these reasons was the
belief that higher rates on savings at institutions
would increase the amount of funds available for
mortgages. On the following day the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board raised the maximum rates savings
and loan associations are permitted to pay.
There was no explicit mention of bank credit in
the press release which announced the change. How-
ever, it was pointed out that:
“The revisions in the Board’s Regulation 9 ceil-
ing rates were held to moderate size, so as not
to foster sudden and large movements of funds
into the banking system that could cause distor-
tions in traditional financial flows or lead to an
upsurge in bank lending.”
During the Sixties the idea that Regulation Q is a
major instrument for controlling bank credit became
the predominant rationale behind the structure of
the ceilings. Implicit in this viesv was the importance
of bank credit as a target variable in monetary sta-
bilization policy. It does appear reasonable that the
growth of credit extended by banks is associated with
the growth of spending in the economy, and that ap-
propriate stabilization policy during a period of ex-
cessive spending \vould be restricting the growth of
bank credit, It should be recognized, however, that
there are alternative channels through which funds
flow from savers to borrowers.
Savers, who are discouraged from putting their
funds in banks or other thrift institutions because of
low yields, have had alternative, higher earning assets
available. Therefore, any slosving in the growth of
bank deposits and hence bank credit, which is caused
by restricting competition, is probably offset by a rise
in the flow of funds through unregulated markets,
leaving the growth of total credit unaffected. In 1969,
for example, at the same time that the outstanding
volume of large negotiable GD’s declined $13 billion,
the outstanding volume of commercial paper in-
creased by $11.5 billion. A stronger demand by indi-
viduals for small denomination ($1,000 and $5,000)
Treasury bills also developed, as savers sought higher
returns than banks were permitted to pay.
The impact of Regulation 9 has encouraged banks
to find nondeposit sources of funds. During the past
two years, they found supplemental sources of funds
in the sale of commercial paper by bank subsidiaries
and holding companies and in Euro-dollar transac-
tions. The channelling of dollars through Europe to
avoid interest rate restrictions increased the cost an’d
distance of flows of funds and led to new regulations
imposing reserve requirements on such borrowing.
Regulations concerning the sale of coiumercial paper
are pending, while commercial banks continue to seek
ways to avoid the discriminatory impact of Regula-
tion 9.
Summary and Conclusions
The Banking Act of 1933 authorized the Federal
Reserve Board to establish maximum rates which
banks may pay for funds. In November of that year,
the Federal Reserve Board adopted Regulation 9,
which imposed a ceiling rate of 3 per cent on mem-
ber bank time and savings deposits. The action was
taken to help avoid un\vise competition among banks
and its detrimental effects on the soundness of banks,
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While the ceilings have been raised on occasion
in order to permit some competition for funds,
changes in the spreads between the ceiling rates and
market rates sometimes have been allowed to occur
with the intention of increasing the flow of funds
toward nonbank thrift institutions or influencing
the growth of bank credit. The primary justifica-
tion for the current structure of Regulation 9
ceilings has been its presumed control on bank credit
for purposes of economic stabilization. Given this
goal, the adverse impact of Regulation 9 ceilings on
bank liquidity at certain times has probably been
intended. However. Regulation 9 cannot control total
credit in the economy, since funds leaving bank time
deposits are channelled through unregulated markets
or return to banks through nondeposit sources of
funds.
Though the growth of total credit probably is un-
affected by Regulation 9, the allocation of credit is
affected. At times when ceilings restrict the amount
of funds available to financial intermediaries, borrow-
ers in the unregulated markets are able to obtain
funds more cheaply than if all markets were freely
competitive, while borrowers who rely on banks or
other thrift institutions are forced to pay a higher
price or may find funds simply unavailable. The sit-
uation is analogous for savers. Holders of large
amounts of liquid funds with knowledge of capital
markets can receive the highest return available,
while those who must rely on regulated institutions
to hold and accumulate savings receive a lower re-
turn than if banks were free to compete.
It appears that interest rate restrictions on financial
intermediaries impose inequities on our economy, dis-
criminating against housing, small savers, and the
regulated financial institutions, They encourage in-
efficiencies as banks try to reroute funds, inter-
mediaries try to compete through premiums, and
Government agencies have to find both new regu-
lations and ways to ease the burden on those most
severely hurt. It further appears that interest rate
restrictions are of little consequence in the control of
total credit or total spending in the economy. At the
same time, there is no evidence that the absence of
Regulation 9 would be detrimental to the equity of
the economy, the solvency of the banking system, or
the control of total spending.
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